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Methods
We estimated models to predict thirteen cost and 
utilization measures in 17.4 million commercially 
insured people using diagnoses, age, and sex 
from Thomson-Reuters MarketScan® 2007 claims 
data.
Using the same data, we imputed assignment of 
456,781 people to 436 medium-sized primary care 
practitioner (PCP) panels (500 – 5000 patients).
For each measure, a PCP’s performance is judged 
by summing the difference between observed (O) 
and expected (E) outcomes across panel members. 
For each outcome we calculated: mean; coefficient 
of variation, or CV = SD/mean; and both individual 
and grouped R2 as measures of predictive accuracy.
Background
The Patient-Centered Medical Home (PCMH) 
requires fundamental reform of health care 
financing.  We propose a Risk-Based 
Comprehensive Payment system with risk-
adjusted base and bonus payments.
Bundled base payments cover the expected cost 
of primary care services but do not encourage 
quality. Bonus payments incentivize desired 
outcomes by rewarding better-than-expected 
performance in clinical quality, efficiency, and 
patient-centeredness.
Bonus payments can:
• Discourage use of low-value services
• Encourage clinical quality, patient health and
satisfaction
• Provide each practice with a fair opportunity 
to earn appropriate rewards for doing a good 
job with its mix of simple and complex 
patients 
Base and bonus payments require credible risk 
adjustment to discourage practices from cherry-
picking easy patients and dumping difficult ones.
We gratefully acknowledge collaboration with 
scientists at Verisk Health, Inc, and support from 
The Commonwealth Fund.
Discussion
Bonus calculations should account for case-mix 
differences across practice panels.
Risk-adjusted payments for less variable 
outcomes focus incentives on provider-
associated, rather than case-mix-driven or 
random, variations.
Rather than attempting to reward reductions in 
total health spending, risk-sensitive calculations of 
more targeted outcomes will better support the 
goals of a PCMH.
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Results
Using risk models to calculate expected outcomes 
explained 29-49% of the observed patient-level 
and 85-98% of practice-level variation in 
performance, with differential variability.
Deviation from the mean in total health spending 
is more variable at the PCP level than other more 
targeted measures.
Predictive Power of Cost and Utilization Measures
Member-level (N=456,781)
PCP-level 
(N=436)
Description Mean
Coeff. of 
Variation
R2 Grouped R2
Number of prescriptions for 
antibiotics of concern (ABX)
0.571 1.59 29% 94%
Number of prescriptions for 
all antibiotics (AB)
1.061 4.72 32% 98%
Emergency department 
visits
0.181 3.49 25% 85%
Advanced imaging tests, in 
RVUs
3.165 2.36 46% 94%
Total health spending, in 
dollars
$3,675 4.01 49% 94%
Principles for Measuring Performance and Calculating 
Bonuses
1.  Judge performance on observed outcomes in comparison to what is
expected given patient characteristics (O vs. E, not just O)
2.  Provide opportunities for larger bonuses for larger or more complex
panels
3. Weight bonuses to reflect practice case-mix
4. Calculate measures using largest feasible denominators
5. Allow more stable measures to contribute more
6.  In groups of correlated measures, down-weight each individual 
measure
7.  Give higher value activities more weight
8. Limit both payer and provider risk
9. Account for extra-medical factors
10. Enable actionable, transparent feedback based on bonus calculations
Example: Antibiotics of Concern 
(ABX)
Problem: Doctors may over-prescribe high-cost 
or high-risk antibiotics (ABX) as identified by the 
National Committee for Quality Assurance 
(NCQA).
Clinical guideline development is hard. Doctors 
say their patients have conditions that warrant 
ABX prescribing.
Idea: Reward observed ABX use that is less than 
expected, based on patient illness burden.  
Conclusion: Only about half of all AB prescribing 
is for ABX (571 prescriptions per 1000 person 
years vs. 1061); however, AB prescribing exhibits 
nearly 3 times the relative variability (CV = 4.72 
vs. 1.59). Patient-level factors explain about 30% 
of the individual-level variability in either measure 
and 95% of variability across patient panels. Risk-
adjusted ABX is an effective bonus measure 
because it targets an activity that we want doctors 
to change, and panels can be adequately adjusted 
for patient-level differences.   
